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SUMMARY 
It is not uncommon for decision makers to base their decisions on 
multiple information systems. Doctors evaluate a patient's multiple symp­
toms, stock brokers evaluate several conditions of the market, and col­
lege administrators must evaluate several facets of a potential student. 
In each case, the central process is one of reducing a number of error-
prone informational inputs into a single estimate. Brunswik's lens model 
has proven to be a valuable tool in conceptualizing this type of judgment 
process and it is within the framework of this model that the present 
study was conceived. 
In laboratory studies of judgment processes, it is usual to study 
the subject's learning when provided with feedback of the "correct" 
answers over a series of trials. As a variant to this, some researchers 
have provided the subject with information about the problem structure, 
or his information usage. However no reported study has examined the 
effect of what might be called "evaluative feedback", where the subject 
is told only how well he is doing (good or bad), rather than receiving a 
numerical feedback. This research undertook a laboratory study of the 
effects of evaluative feedback on learning of, and performance in, a 
multiple-cue inference task. The findings of the study have contributed 
both to our understanding of the processes involved in learning of such 





The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an intro­
duction to (Egon Brunswik's) lens model. The original formulation and 
its application to human judgment has been modified and enhanced by sev­
eral other individuals and provides a workable framework for studying 
man's judgmental processes. This chapter will review several empirical 
studies within this framework leading to an explanation of the research 
conducted with this paper. 
Historical Background 
From the beginning of time, man has always been faced with deci­
sion making and the problem of how to improve his decision making ability. 
For practically the entire history of man, decisions have been made al­
most entirely by intuition. Although man could educate himself concern­
ing a specific task, this education came about primarily through experi­
ence for man had yet to develop a method to transfer experience from 
one man to another. We have yet to completely understand the application 
of knowledge which in turn can not be approached without first under­
standing the learning process. 
In 1956 Egon Brunswik published his theory of the learning process 
within what he called the "lens model". It was a most significant theory 
in that it linked the task with the individual attempting to learn that 
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task (Edwards 1971). Central to Brunswik's work is the observation 
that the environment in which we operate is uncertain and probabilistic. 
For example, the phenomenon of size constancy depends on the subject's 
ability to integrate several error-prone size cues. Estimates of an 
object's size are based on cues (distance from the observer, angle to 
the observer, etc.) of differing ecological values (correlation between 
the object's actual size and the cues). These same cues, however, have 
different utilization values to the individual perceiving the object. 
Brunswik's general formulation of the lens model treats these dimensions 
within a single framework. 
A particularly fruitful extension of the lens model has been its 
application to human judgment and inference phenomena such as diagnosis 
by clinical neurologists, interpretation of MMPI profiles (Kleinmuntz, 
1968) and estimates of student performances (Hammond, Hursch and Todd, 
1964). The common features of such situations are that an "expert" or 
"judge" makes some sort of inference or estimate of an underlying (distal) 
variable from several imperfect informational inputs (cues). When study­
ing these phenomena consideration is given to the relationships between 
the distal variable and the set of interrelated cues. Consideration is 
then given to the relationships between these interrelated cues and the 
subject's response. The model therefore provides a basis for the study 
of complex human judgmental tasks. These relationships are displayed in 
Figure 1. 
Definitions 
The following terms are those primarily used when working with the 
3 









Figure 1. Brunswik's Lens Model 
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lens model: 
Y^ - the established true state of the distal variable. The e 
subject may or may not have access to its actual value. 
- represents the ith cue or information source describing 
the distal variable. These cues must be quantifiable if 
only at the 0-1 level (yes/no, hi/lo). 
Y g - the subject's response or his estimate of the value of 
the distal variable, Y . 
' e 
$ e - the best linear prediction of the distal variable from 
the cues. 
A . 
Y g - the best linear prediction of the subject s response from 
the cues. 
r££ - the simple correlation between an individual cue, X^, and 
the distal variable. This is called the ecological va­
lidity of the ith cue. 
r_. - the simple correlation between an individual cue, X., 
and the subject's estimate. This is called the subject's 
utilization coefficient for the ith cue. 
r - achievement coefficient of the decision maker: the cor-a 
relation between his prediction and the actual distal 
variable (r ). 
R £ - the linear predictability of the distal variable: the 
correlation between the distal variable and the linear 
model of the distal variable (rv A ) . 
e e 
R g - the linear predictability of the decision maker: the 
correlation between the decision maker's predictions 
5 
and the linear model of the decision maker (ry A ). 
s s 
G - the correlation between the predicted response from the 
linear model of the decision maker and those from the 
linear model of the distal variable. It has been called 
the "matching index" (Slovic and Tichtenslein, 1971) 
or a measure of the subject's "knowledge" (Hammond and 
Summers, 1972). 
C - the nonlinear component of the judgmental accuracy: 
correlation between the residual values of the distal 
variable and the residual values of the decision maker's 
predictions after linear components in both have been 
removed. 
In an important work, Hursch, Hammond and Hursch (1964) derived 
equations facilitating study of human judgmental tasks within the frame­
work of the lens model. Tucker (1964) presented a simpler, more elegant 
formulation relating the various dimensions of the model in a concise 
manner. The following was taken from that article. 
Assuming all variables standardized Tucker considered the variables 
A A 
Y e and Y g defined as; 
$ e = p e l X l + . . . + e e n x n 
where the p's are the multiple linear regression weights for predicting 
Y e and Y g from the multiple cues. 
Tucker then defines a residual error for each variable, Z £ and Z g 
such that 
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Ys + Y s + Z s 
From multiple linear regression theory 
and 
Var(YJ = R 2 e e 
Var(Yj = R 2 
o s 
while 
Var(Ze) = 1-R| 
Var(Zj = 1-R2 
o S 
Cov(xy) = r x yVv(x)V(y) 
By definition: 
r = Cov(Y Y ) = Cov(Y Y ) + Cov(Z Z ) a e s e s e s 
A A 
and thus it can be shown by substitution where G = r(Y Y ) and C = r(Z Z ) 
J e s e e 
that 
r = GR R + CV(1-R2)(1-R2) a e s v e / v s' 
This is the basic equation used with the lens model when analyzing data. 
Notice that this equation reduces to a simple relationship under 
any of the conditions a) R = 1, b) R g = 1, or c) C = 0. Under these 
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conditions the term 
oV(l-R*)(l-R*) e s 
disappears. Specifically if C = 0 (i.e. there is no systematic non­
linear matching), the achievement correlation becomes simply a product 
of the knowledge (G) the subject has of the task, the predictability (R£) 
of the environment and the predictability (Rg) of the subject's response 
system. That is 
r a = GR eR s 
for linear task systems. 
Studies Concerning Judgmental Strategies 
With the lens model providing the framework there have been a 
wealth of studies attempting to represent the decision maker's policy in 
various task environments as a linear model. These tasks include person­
ality characteristic judgments (Hammond, Hursch, and Todd, 1964); per­
formance in college (Dawes, 1971; Einhorn, 1971); attractiveness of com­
mon stocks (Slovic, 1969); and physical and mental pathology (Goldberg, 
1970; Oskamp, 1962; Wiggins and Hoffman, 1968). At least one thing 
emerged from all these studies that was of importance - the linear model 
does a very good job of predicting the judgments of the decision makers 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971) . 
Despite this overwhelming success of the linear model, there still 
has grown an active interest in what could be called "configural judges" 
(Goldberg, 1968) or those decision makers who use complex, non-linear 
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strategies. Many early studies using nonlinear models of the judgmental 
policies, however, showed "no substantial increment of predictable re­
sponse variance over that contributed by the linear model" (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971). But as was indicated by Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1971) these findings did not preclude nonlinearity since a lack of non-
linearity between the environment and the response system could produce 
linearity indications. This fact along with 1) assertions by decision­
makers that their processes really are complex; 2) possibilities that 
previous experimenters had not yet studied a truly configural model; and 
3) possibilities that the experimental designs and statistical procedures 
of previous experiments were not optimally suited for discovering con­
figural effects, kept the search alive for the configural thinker. From 
a study by Einhorn (1971) in which he concluded that cognitive complexity 
and mathematical complexity can often counterbalance each other (in other 
words a strategy with greater mathematical complexity might have a lesser 
cognitive complexity), it seems appropriate to assume that the configural 
process will play a greater role in the understanding of learning despite 
its limited ability to out predict the linear model (Slovic and Lichten­
stein, 1971). 
Subjective Policies and Self Insight 
Another way to assess the weighting policy other than fitting a 
regression model to the subject's responses is to have the subject de­
scribe the relative weights he used in arriving at a response to the task. 
The correlation of these subjective weightings and the computed policies 
gives some indication of the insight the subject has into his actual 
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strategy (see Hoffman, 1960). All studies in this area seem to agree 
that judges strongly overestimate their use of minor cues and strongly 
underestimate their use of major cues. Indeed across several studies it 
has been shown that three cues usually account for 80% of the predictable 
variance while one cue typically accounted for 40% of the variance (Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971). A study by Slovic, Fleissner and Bauman (1972) 
which examined the relationship of self insight to amount of experience, 
indicated that over time self insight even decreases. It appears that 
the most experienced judges produce verbal rationales that are less trust­
worthy than those of the novice judges. 
Studies Concerning Variation of Cues and Utilization 
There have been quite a few studies that have examined the role 
of the cues themselves in determining a weighting policy. Slovic (1966) 
and Hoffman (1968) indicated that when certain cues agreed in their impli­
cations, subjects tended to weight them equally. If these cues disagreed, 
however, other cues were used to resolve the differences. Along these 
same lines Uhl and Hoffman (1968) hypothesized that an increase in the 
variability of a salient cue, across a set of stimuli, would lead to 
greater weighting of this cue by a decision maker. Behind this was the 
idea that a decision maker tries to make differential predictions and 
any cues which indicate a differentiation would only reinforce this tend­
ency (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). In testing this hypothesis, Uhl 
and Hoffman found that by varying a particularly strong cue the hypoth­
esized effect was indicated. When they manipulated a minor cue, however, 
no effect was found. 
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Another variable which can be manipulated is the number of cues. 
Apparently there has been relatively little research done on the effects 
of varying the number of cues, despite what seems to be obvious interest. 
One early study by Hoffman and Blanchard (1961) (as reported in Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971) generated some very interesting results. By 
increasing the number of cues they found that the subjects produced lower 
R g values, decreased accuracy and lower response variance. Unfortunately 
they used a small number of subjects which somewhat limits their conclu­
sions. Hayes (1964) and Einhorn (1971) reinforced this early study, with 
Einhorn interpreting the decrease in R s as an indication of the subject's 
use of a more complex strategy with more information. 
Another interesting finding is reported by Oskamp (1965) who used 
32 "experts" and asked them not only to make a judgmental decision but 
also to give a confidence rating of their decision. When he increased 
the amount of information available to the subject he found that their 
confidence increased way out of proportion to the amount of increase in 
accuracy. The study provided us, therefore, with a small amount of evi­
dence to indicate that by increasing the amount of information available 
to the decision maker we can increase his confidence while his decision 
quality is not increased and his decisions become more difficult to pre­
dict (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). 
One final concept that concerns cue variables is the idea of cue 
consistency. Hoffman (1968) described cue consistency in the following 
manner: 
1) The consistency of a stimulus is the extent to which the 
distinguishing cues or characteristics of the stimulus match 
those of the population (of objects or persons) of which the 
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stimulus is a member. 2) The consistency of a stimulus is the 
sum of the consistencies of the seperate cues. 3) The consist­
ency of a stimulus is the degree to which the defining cues or 
characteristics of the stimulus, when considered in their total­
ity by the judge, are perceived by him to be representative of 
an actual familiar, known or believable stimulus or object. 
It is important, therefore, that the task cues be consistent not only 
with each other but with any perception the subject has with the problem, 
a consideration that must be made when designing an experiment. If find­
ings are to be of.any value to understanding "real world" learning situa­
tions then cue consistency would seem to be an important design criteria. 
Indeed not only should a consideration be made for cue consistency but 
as Connolly (1973) suggests, 
The non-conscious process of perception may be ... viewed as an 
(intuitive) "making sense" of a multiple stimulus situation, 
where the "knowledge" used is acquired unconsciously over a 
period of time from everyday experience, ... 
In fact Connolly points out that factors such as cue interrelationships, 
types of feedback, verbal context, time pressures and possibly earlier 
experiences should be considered together, "and must be so designed as 
to form an internally consistent package". 
Studies on Learning to Use Information 
There have been quite a few studies in the area of learning infor­
mation processing. One easy way to partition these studies would be 
according to availability of cues, distinguishing those studies with one 
cue available to the subject from those with multiple cues available. 
My focus here will be on multiple cue learning which seems to have rele­
vance to a variety of "real world" situations in which a decision maker 
must integrate several sources of information. In the majority of these 
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studies we find the lens model is used as a base for conceptualizing the 
problem. Although Bayesian studies pretty much parallel the lens model 
research, they seem rather uninterested in learning. There are, however, 
a handful of Bayesian studies that do consider learning, notably; Martin 
and Gettys (1968) who compared performance with nominal feedback or prob­
abilistic feedback; Phillips and Edwards (1966) who studied performance 
under different payoff conditions; and Peterson, Ducharme and Edwards 
(1968) and Wheeler and Beach (1968) whose studies were "oriented to the 
misperception explanation of conservatism" (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1971). In using the lens model, typically the independent variables are, 
1) number of cues; 2) r e i values and the multiple correlation R e; 3) the 
various forms of the functional relationships between cues and the distal 
variable; 4) intercorrelation between cues; 5) feedback; and 6) a verbal 
context for the task. Most likely the subject will be given certain 
stimuli or cues, asked to respond with a judgment and then be given some 
form of feedback. So far major results have shown us (according to Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971); 
1) Subjects can learn to use linear cues appropriately (Lee and 
Tucker, 1962; Summers, 1962; and Uhl, 1963); 2) Learning of non­
linear functions occurs but is slower than learning of linear 
relationships (Brehmer, 1969; Hammond and Summers, 1965; Sheets 
and Miller, in press; Summers, 1967; and Summers, Summers and 
Karkau, 1969) and is especially difficult if the subjects are not 
forwarned that the relations may not be nonlinear (Earle, 1970); 
Hammond and Summers, 1965; and Summers and Hammond, 1966); 3) 
Subjects can learn to detect changes in relative cue weights over 
time although they do so slowly (Peterson, Hammond and Summers, 
1965; Summers, 1969); 4) It is easier for subjects to learn which 
cue to use than to discover which functional rule relates a known 
valid cue to the criterion; learning both of these simultaneously 
is especially difficult (Summers, 1967, 1969); 5) In a two cue 
task, pairing a cue of low or medium validity with one of high 
validity is detrimental to performance (a distraction effect), 
while pairing a cue of low validity with another of medium or 
13 
low validity is facilitative (Dudycha and Naylor, 1966); and 
6) Subjects can learn to use valid cues even when they are not 
perceived with perfect reliability (Brehmer, 1970). 
Feedback Manipulations 
To date the majority of correlational studies have dealt with only 
two types of feedback, either outcome feedback where a subject is given 
the correct answer after every trial, or lens model feedback where the 
subject is provided information about the problem structure, or his in­
formation usage. From these studies emerged several findings that showed 
that lens model feedback was a more effective aid to learning than out­
come feedback (Hammond and Boyle, 1970; and Todd and Hammond, 1965). In 
these particular studies, however, the ecological structure or criterion 
information feedback did not include random error. The single available 
study of the effects of error-prone feedback on learning and performance 
is that of Miklausich (1974). He argues that in most "real world" judg­
ment tasks, feedback will typically be error-prone. His study showed 
that as misinformation increases in a multiple-cue probability learning 
task under error-prone feedback the achievement correlation will decrease. 
Additionally one can argue that while the studies on lens model 
and outcome feedback showed the superiority of lens model feedback, it is 
unrealistic to assume that lens model feedback is readily available to 
the "real world" decision maker. Most individuals who make decisions 
concerning complex tasks do not have the handy access to a computer as 
does the scientist or the clinical analyst. It seems likely that "real 
world" judgment skills are commonly aquired under conditions of degraded 
feedback - i.e. error-prone, delayed, intermittent, evaluative, or even 
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non-existent. There does seem to be, therefore, a whole set of decision 
makers who utilize multiple information systems and receive feedback 
that does not provide either the ecological information or the exact in­
formation concerning the task. Instead they receive vague evaluations 
of how well they are doing rather than a quantified feedback such as in 
outcome or lens model feedback. Because of the evaluative nature of this 
type of feedback I chose to call it "Evaluative Feedback". In the aca­
demic world evaluative feedback is evidenced by a pass/fail grading sys­
tem in which a student is evaluated as either passing or failing. Since 
many factors could affect this evaluation, there seem to be many pieces 
of information represented by one small piece of information. In the 
business world a pay raise or refusal of a pay raise indicates an evalua­
tion of sorts to the individual seeking the raise. If he gets the raise 
he knows he is doing well; if he does not get the raise he may think he 
is doing poorly. A production manager might look at the rise or fall of 
the production rate as an evaluation of his policies. The point is that 
in all these situations the subject is receiving only a vague evaluation 
of how well he is doing rather than some quantified numerical feedback. 
Since evaluative feedback appears to be a common "real world" learning 
situation, research can be of value in this area. 
Dimensions of Evaluative Feedback 
Evaluative feedback, then is any feedback which provides the sub­
ject information on how well he is performing rather than receiving some 
type of numerical feedback. Although within the framework of the lens 
model several aspects of evaluative feedback may be varied, the dimension 
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of interest here is the number of classes of evaluative feedback avail­
able to the subject. 
Research Question 
"What are the effects of evaluative feedback in learning and per­
formance in a multiple-cue probability learning problem?" 
Hypothesis 
In a multiple-cue probability learning task under evaluative feed­
back, achievement will increase as the number of classes of evaluative 
feedback are increased. 
A laboratory experiment designed to test this hypothesis is de­
scribed in the following chapter. 
Summary 
In summary, then, we conceive human judgment as a setting in which 
decision makers base their decisions on multiple error-prone information 
sources. Doctors evaluate a patient's multiple symptoms, stock brokers 
evaluate several conditions of the stock market and college administrators 
must evaluate the several facets of a potential student. In each case, 
the central process is one of reducing a number of error-prone informa­
tional inputs into a single estimate, judgement, or evaluation. Brunswik's 
lens model has proven to be a valuable tool in conceptualizing this type 
of judgment process and it is within the framework of this model that the 
present study is conceived. 
In laboratory studies of judgment processes, it is usual to study 
the subject's learning when provided with outcome feedback over a series 
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of trials. As a variant of this procedure, some researchers have pro­
vided the subjects with information about the problem structure, or their 
information usage. However, no reported study has examined the effect 
of what could be called evaluative feedback, where the subject is told 
only how well he is doing rather than receiving a numerical feedback. 
Since evaluative feedback seems a common "real world" learning situation, 
it appears that research would be of value. The proposed research will 
undertake a laboratory study of the effects of evaluative feedback on 
learning of, and performance in, a multiple-cue inference task. The 
findings of this study will, it is hoped, contribute both to our under­
standing of the processes involved in learning of such complex tasks, 






The purpose of this chapter is to explain to the reader what cri­
teria were considered in designing this experiment, how it was designed 
and what methods or procedures were used in administering the actual 
experiment and collection of data. 
Task Design 
In order to collect the data a hypothetical situation had to be 
constructed so the subjects would have a reasonable task to perform. A 
reasonable task is one that is neither too easy (a task in which all sub­
jects achieve and hold the same level of learning after only a few trials) 
nor too hard (a task in which no subject is able to display any learning 
despite the number of trials). As expressed by Hoffman (1968), "It should 
[also] be recognized ... that certain patterns or configurations of cues 
ought, collectively, to 'go together', to 'be congruent' or to be 'con­
sistent' in order for them to identify meaningful objects or persons". 
This means that the cues, when presented to a subject in a specific envi­
ronment, should be representative of an actual, familiar, known or be­
lievable stimulus or object (Hoffman, 1968). The factors, therefore, 
that the subject looks for to "make sense of the problem", such as verbal 
context, interrelationship of the cues, and relevance to any prior experi­
ence should be designed so as to form a consistent package (Connolly, 
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1972). 
To test the hypothesis proposed in Chapter I it was necessary to 
design a moderately complex linear task with four treatments correspond-
ing to four separate groups of subjects. Group I received a basic verbal 
context and was given outcome feedback; the purpose of this group was to 
act as a base line with which to compare the performances of the remain­
ing groups. Group II received the basic verbal context plus they had 2 
classes of evaluative feedback available. Group III had the basic verbal 
context plus 3 classes of evaluative feedback while Group IV had the 
basic verbal context plus 5 classes of feedback made available. All four 
groups received their first 40 trials with no feedback so that perform­
ance with feedback could be compared to performance without feedback. 
Verbal Context 
The basic verbal context which was common to all groups placed the 
subject in the position of someone desiring to estimate the future per­
formance of the stock market (perhaps in fun or to determine when to 
invest). Before he makes this estimate, however, the subject is to so­
licit the opinions of three local stockbrokers on what they think the 
daily change will be. With three opinions in hand the subject was asked 
to make his own prediction. In addition to the verbal context each of 
the groups was told that after each of their predictions they would re­
ceive either a) the actual market performance for that day (Group I) or 
b) an evaluation of their predictions based on actual market performance 
(Groups II, III and IV). 
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Task Properties 
The problem used for this experiment was a three cue task in which 
the distal variable (Ye) represented the daily change of the stock market 
as expressed by the Dow Jones average. Y e was designed to be normally 
distributed with an average change of ± 10 points arbitrarily chosen as 
the standard deviation and with a mean of 0. This generated a hypotheti­
cal set of stock market changes with 67% of the changes being within ± 
10 points. 
The cues, or opinions of the local experts, were generated by 
means of the following equations; 
X ± - Y e ± e ± • i - 1,2,3 
where 
e ~N(0,225), e 2~N(0,25), e 3~N(0,100). 
With the use of e^ containing different variances, it was possible 
to generate three realistic error-prone stock market experts of varying 
accuracy. The sample ecological validities (r ̂ ) (the correlations of 
the experts predictions to the actual market changes) were: 
r = .63 r 0 = .90 r , = .67 
el e2 eJ 
This gave the subject one fairly competent expert (X2) and two relatively 
poor experts (X-̂  and X^) . By use of a random number generator a set of 
cues was generated that could be displayed to the subject in a random 
manner. R e, or the limits to achievement, for the first 40 trials was 
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.938 while it dropped to .934 for the second 40 trials. 
Evaluative Feedback Criteria 
Once the basic problem was designed a means of evaluating subjects 
had to be determined. Since the subjects would be receiving evaluations 
based on the actual stock market performance, Y e was used as the evalua­
tion guide. The subjects would simply receive an evaluation of "good" 
if they were relatively close to Y e or a bad evaluation if they were 
more remote. With this in mind the evaluations were formulated as seen 
in Table 1. 
Although the intervals for the evaluations were arbitrarily cho­
sen, there was some consideration given as to how close to the distal 
variable the majority of the subjects would respond. 
Procedure 
An overhead projector was used to display the sets of cues to the 
subjects. At the same time the subjects were able to read the cues from 
their answer sheet. The transparency displayed the cues as seen in 
Figure 2. Samples of the answer sheets are displayed in Figures 3-5. 
The answer sheets, which were reproduced by the Xerox copier, 
were placed at selected desks at the test site to preclude observation 
of another subject's work as much as possible. Pencils were also provid­
ed to the subjects. 
For the first 40 trials, testing of each group was identical. The 
cues were displayed as seen in Figure 3 and no feedback was provided. In 
the second half of the experiment the different groups received the feed­
back for which they were designated. In the case of the outcome feedback 
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Table 1. Evaluation Given vs_ Respondent Error for 
2, 3, and 5 Class Feedback Groups 
Response Evaluation 
Group II 
l e + 2.0| < 
|Y I 
i s 1 
< |Y 
I e 
+ 2.0| "good" 
"bad" 
Group III M < 1 e + 1.0| "good" 
1 Y  e + 1.01 < |Y 1 1 s 1 < 1 Y 1 e + 2.5| "fair" 
1 Y 1 e + 2.5| < 
|Y 1 1 s 1 "bad" 
Group IV 
l S 1 
< |Y + .5| "very good" 
|Y 
i e + .5| < lYsl < 1 Y i e + 1.5 | "good" 
|Y 
I e + 1.5| < lYsl < I e + 2 .01 "fair" 
|Y 
i e + 2.0 | < l s 1 < 1 e + 4.0| "bad" 
|Y 
I e + 4.0| |Y 1 1 s 1 
"very bad" 
x 1 x 2 x 3 
-19.6 ^ 7 0 -6.0 
2. 39.4 25.8 30.9 
3. -10.5 1.0 -. 1 
Figure 2. Cues as Displayed on Screen. 
Figure 3. Sample Answer Sheet for the 1st 40 Trials. 
EH 
M 
X1 V X 3 3T
0U
R 
41 . -22 .9 -22.4 -35.5 
42. -11 .3 1.9 5.4 
43. -2 .0 8.4 -3.6 
Figure 4. Sample Answer Sheet for Outcome Feedback Groups. 
EH o 






41 . -22 .9 -22.4 -35.5 G F B 
42. -1 1 .3 1.9 5.4 G F Ji 
43. -2 .0 8.4 -3.6 G F B 
Figure 5. Sample Answer Sheet for Evaluative 
Feedback (Group III). 
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group (I), they were given the actual stock market change after each 
trial and asked to record that value in the space provided. They were 
told that this could be used in making future predictions, however no 
scratch work was authorized. In the case of the evaluative feedback 
groups (II, III, IV) the tester went from subject to subject to individ­
ually evaluate each response. This was done so as not to bias other sub­
jects' performances. Again no scratch work was allowed. The tester was 
able to evaluate each subject by merely taking a quick glance at a pre-
computed chart which listed the intervals for the appropriate evaluations. 
This chart is listed in the appendix. 
At the conclusion of the experiment the subjects were asked to 
answer the following questions in an effort to gain some insight into 
their understanding of the problem. 
1. How did you set about making your predictions? 
2. Did you feel that any one of the "experts" was better or 
worse than any of the others? If so, which were better, which worse? 
3. Did you feel the feedback you got in the second half of the 
experiment helped you make a better prediction? 
Subj ects 
The subject pool consisted of unpaid students attending the 
Georgia Institute of Technology. Each member of the pool was assigned 





This chapter deals with the results of the experiment. The first 
section deals with the testing and analysis of the major hypothesis while 
the second section will deal with secondary analysis of the data. 
Primary Analysis 
The major hypothesis was previously stated as; Hypothesis - In a 
multiple-cue probability learning task under evaluative feedback, as the 
number of classes of evaluative feedback increases achievement will also 
increase. 
The data in all four groups was analyzed using the STATPAC rou­
tine, RESTEM, to derive regression equations to fit the models of each 
A A 
subject s estimates and therefore providing the parameters Y e and Y g. 
These intermediate parameters were then used to generate the necessary 
correlations, r a, R e, R g, and G by means of the STATPAC routine CORAN. 
R.A. Fischer's Z-transformation was then applied to these correlations 
since the distribution of Z values is approximately normal (McNemar, 
1969). This allowed averaging and subsequent analysis of variance. 
The hypothesis concerned the comparison of achievements reached 
by the four groups and therefore, r a was plotted and analyzed, first for 
the no feedback condition and then for the feedback condition. The val­
ues for R e, limit of achievement, R s, cognitive control, and G, knowledge 
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of the task were also plotted to aid with interpretation. The data pro­
vided strong support for a direct contradiction to the major hypothesis. 
It indicated that as the number of classes of evaluative feedback are 
increased the level of performance deteriorates. Results and analysis 
are displayed in Figure 6 and Tables 2 and 3. 
Notice that in Table 2, which analyzes the mean r a across groups 
for trials 1-40, there was no significant difference in performance. But 
Table 3, which analyzes performance under feedback, indicates there is a 
strong deterioration effect due to feedback. 
Secondary Analysis 
Recall that the experiment was divided into two sets of 40 trials, 
the first 40 trials receiving no feedback and the second 40 receiving the 
appropriate feedback for that group. Because individual subjects in each 
group are completely different it was necessary to investigate the indi­
vidual gains of each subject from a no feedback situation to a feedback 
situation. By doing this it was seen if the subjects' improvement or 
deterioration was caused by the effect of feedback. In all groups a 
change in achievement appears to be associated with the introduction of 
feedback. In the case of evaluative feedback the gain was a negative 
one thereby supporting the results of the primary analysis. This analy­
sis also indicates that evaluative feedback is worse than no feedback, a 
very counter-intuitive finding indeed (it seems that some information 
should be better than no information at all). These results and analysis 
are displayed in Figure 7 and Table 4. It was also desired to gain in­
sight into the problem by determining if the subject's performance was 
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Table 2. Mean r a by Groups, Trials 1-40 
Mean r a (based on 
Z-transformation 
Group 1 (outcome feedback)(n-5) .858 
Group II (2 class feedback)(n=5) .893 
Group III (3 class feedback)(n=5) .908 
Group IV (5 class feedback)(n-5) .869 
ANOVA (on Z-transformations) 
Source of Variation D.F. M.S. F-ratio 
Feedback 3 .05383 1.9116 (N.S.) 
Error 16 .02816 
Total 19 
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Table 3. Mean r a by groups, Trials 41-80 
Mean r (based on 
Z-transformations) 
Group I (outcome feedback)(n-5) .891 
Group II (2 class feedback)(n=5) .833 
Group III (3 class feedback)(n=5) .786 
Group IV (5 class feedback)(n=5) .708 
ANOVA (on Z-transformed r a values) 
Source of Variation D.F. M.S. F-ratio 
Feedback 3 .265 8.761 (p<.001) 
Error 16 .0302 
Total 19 
Duncan's Multiple Range Test (Appendix, p. 65) shows 
Gp I 4 Gp III 
Gp I ^ Gp IV 
Gp II ± Gp IV 
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Table 4. Gain Scores Between First and 
Second Blocks, by Groups 
Note: Gain Score = d = [ra(Trials 41-80)] - [ ra(Trials 1-40)] 
Mean Gain Score fa p** 
Group I (outcome feedback)(n=5) .0336 2 .806 (P < .05) 
Group II (2cl feedback)(n=5) -.0570 -2 .856 (P < .05) 
Group III (3cl feedback)(n=5) -.1218 -4 .912 (P * .01) 
Group IV (5cl feedback)(n=5) -.1758 -3 .849 (P ^ .025; 
* t 0 ~ c / — ~ tcx/0tn-l (Hines and Montgomery, 1972) s//n z 
** Null Hypothesis: Gain Scores and distributed normally, with mean zero. 
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Figure 7. Individual Gain Scores Between First and 
Second Blocks, by Groups. 
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due primarily to R g, cognitive control, or G, knowledge of the problem. 
Hammond and Summers (1972) suggest that "aquisition of knowledge and 
application of knowledge are independent components" and that they can 
be separated empirically. It is of interest, then, to determine whether 
changes in G or changes in R s are more strongly associated with the dete­
rioration in performance, r a < 
To examine this matter, we calculate: 
r(r a,R g) ~ the correlation between achievement, r a, and the cor­
relation of the subject's linear regression equation estimates and his 
actual estimates of the distal variable; and 
r(r G) ~ *-he correlation between achievement and the correlation 
of the subject's linear regression equation estimates and the linear 
regression equation estimates of the distal variable. 
The data yielded the following values: 
r(r a,R s) "..8993 = .3270 
suggesting that R g, rather than G, is primarily responsible for the 
observed change in r^. 
In order to test the statistical significance of the difference, 
the statistic W suggested by Graybill (1961) was used on Z-transformed 
values of these correlations. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Test of Statistical Significance of Difference 
Between r (ra,Rg) a n d r(r a,G). 







2 2 2 W = Z (nt -3)(Zt -Z) z ~ X with 1 df 
i=l 
W = 23.5808 (p < .0001) 
This indicates that there is in fact a highly significant difference 
between r, „ >. and r, n^ which in turn implies that the subject's 
achievement failure was due primarily to the failure of the subject to 
consistently apply his own regression equation model. In other words it 
seems that although the subject's potential for application (knowledge 
of the task) was relatively high, his inability to apply this knowledge 
(cognitive control) prevented a potentially high achievement (Hammond 
and Summers, 1972). Using Hammond and Summers theory then, the poor 
performance seems to be due primarily to loss of cognitive control. 
A final analysis was made to determine if there were any positive 
change in performance over the second 40 trials. If there was such a 
change then this might indicate that more trials were needed to uncover 
the real effect of evaluative feedback. To do this r a and R e were re­
computed for trials 41-60 and trials 61-80 and a ratio r a/R e was defined 
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as percent achievement. This ratio was formed because there was a 
reasonably large change in R e for the last 20 trials (Re for trials 41-
60 was .958, R e for trials 61-80 was .885), making it possible for a 
subject's performance to appear to deteriorate while in fact his per­
cent achievement would be increasing. This analysis (Table 6, Figure 8) 
found no significant learning within the second block of 40 trials. 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire Results 
Recall that each subject was asked to answer three questions at 
the termination of the experiment. After reviewing these comments it 
was discovered that the subjects did indeed become more confused as the 
number of classes of evaluative feedback increased. Of the subjects 
exposed to outcome feedback (n=5), four said that they felt expert no. 2 
(re^ = .9) was the most accurate. Of the subjects who received 2 class 
evaluative feedback (n=5) three said that they too felt expert no. 2 was 
the most accurate. Of the subjects under 3 class and 5 class evaluative 
feedback, however, only one from each group noticed the more accurate 
expert. Similarly, in response to question no. three (Did the feedback 
help you any way?), as the number of classes of evaluative feedback 
increased, the comments indicated that help decreased (See Table 7). 
In response to question one (Describe the strategy used to arrive at a 
prediction) there seemed to be the common strategy across all four groups 
of straight averaging. Although these comments do support the major 
hypothesis, it should be noted that self-insight has been shown to be 
rather untrustworthy In explaining individual strategies. 
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Table 6. Percent Achievement by Groups, 
Trials 41-60 and 61-80 
Percent Achievement 
Groups (?a/Re) 
Trials 41-60 Trials 61-80 
I (0/C FB) .940 .990 
II (2cl FB) .880 .920 
III (3cl FB) .840 .860 
IV (5cl FB) .850 .740 
Figure 8. Percent Achievement by Groups, Trials 4 1 - 6 0 
and 61-80 
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Table 7. Tabulation of Answers to 
Post-Experiment Questions 
Picked X 2 as the Said Feedback was 








Gp IV 1 0 
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Analysis of Treatment Effects 
As noted earlier, the cut off scores for the various evaluative 
feedback categories were set arbitrarily (Table 1). Table 8 below, shows 
the breakdown of feedback actually received for groups I, II, and III 
and shows clearly that the levels chosen were too severe. In fact, the 
evaluations which would have been received by an imaginary subject using 
the optimal (regression equation) strategy would have been only moderate 
(i.e. about 50% "good" evaluations and 50% "bad" evaluations in Group 
II). This suggests that the present results may apply only to "severe" 
evaluative feedback. Replication with less stringent cut-off points is 
clearly desireable. 
Summary 
In summary then, the data provide fairly strong support for a 
direct reversal of the major hypothesis. It was shown that achievement 
deteriorates as the number of classes of evaluative feedback increases. 
Secondary analysis indicated that not only was achievement under eval­
uative feedback worse than that under outcome feedback, but it was worse 
than performance with no feedback at all. It appears that this dete­
rioration is due largely to the inability of the subjects to apply their 
knowledge of the task. 
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Table 8. Breakdown of Actual Feedback Received 
by Groups II, III, and IV. 
p II (2cl FB) __G _B 
Subj ect 
Mean 4.2(10.5%) 6.6(16.6%) 29.2(73.5%) 
Group IV (5cl FB) VG G F B VB 
16 4 6 1 5 24 
17 2 4 8 4 22 
18 1 8 4 7 20 
19 2 3 6 12 17 
20 2 7 5 5 21 
Mean 2.2(5.5%) 5.6(16%) 4.8(12%) 6.6(16.5%) 20.8(52%) 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results as presented 
in the previous chapter and their implications, both theoretical and 
practical. Finally recommendations will be made as to what future re­
search should be conducted to verify and expand the results of this 
paper. 
Discussion 
The major hypothesis was directly contradicted by the data as 
presented. In this experiment all groups that received evaluative feed­
back not only performed at a lower achievement level then the control 
group (outcome feedback group), but their performance seemed to deteri­
orate in direct proportion to the number of classes of evaluative feed­
back available. The performance level was also lower than performance 
under a no feedback condition. This deterioration seems to be caused 
primarily by a loss of cognitive control, Rs. 
Let us discuss now some possible artifactual explanations of this 
performance. The first of these that comes to mind is that the subjects 
may have gotten tired or even bored thereby causing the poor performance. 
If this was the case one would expect to find no significant difference 
in deterioration between groups. As was seen, however, there was indeed 
a significant difference across groups due to feedback. It would seem 
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therefore that boredom did not cause any deterioration of performance. 
It is possible, however, that the subjects became discouraged due to a 
preponderance of bad evaluations. It could be argued further that be­
cause a subject receives a low evaluation out of many evaluations rather 
than a low evaluation out of a few evaluations, he would become more dis­
couraged. This would explain the inverse proportion of performance to 
number of classes of evaluative feedback. 
There might also be some real effect explanations. Because of the 
nature of sampling error it was quite possible for a subject to have an 
appropriate model yet still receive bad evaluations to several responses. 
Basically one could be close without being good. This might have led to 
early false abandonment of an appropriate model. Note that all subjects 
in the evaluative feedback groups had relatively good models for their 
first 40 trials but when feedback was introduced they apparently aban­
doned these models for worse ones. The outcome feedback group on the 
other hand apparently substituted better models for the second 40 trials, 
as was expected. 
Outcome feedback is also superior in that it provides the subject 
with two possible alternatives. First he can check his current model to 
see if it is consistent and second he may use the outcome feedback to 
provide some insight into the actual task model and therefore assist him 
in making his next prediction. With evaluative feedback, however, the 
subject can only check his current model. Because he knows nothing of 
the evaluation criteria he gains no insight to the model. 
An immediate, though tentative, implication of these data is that 
if one can not give at least outcome feedback then do not give any feed-
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back at all, at least where other aids such as verbal context are avail­
able. Since more empirical study needs to be done across a range of 
problems and settings, this is only tentative. 
These findings can be applied to several areas, a few of which 
will be discussed here. First consider the "classroom" setting where 
evaluative feedback commonly exists in the form of grades. It was seen 
in this experiment that the more evaluative feedback available to the 
subject the worse his performance was. This would seem to indicate that 
rather than an evaluation the student might learn more if after tests he 
were given the correct answers and the proper methods of arriving at 
them. An evaluation would apparently only serve to confuse the student. 
These findings could also apply to the managerial field where 
decision makers are currently evaluated, usually after blocks of several 
decisions. The subjects of this experiment became confused when feed­
back was given after each trial, a fact that could become magnified if 
the same feedback were given after more than one trial. Managers could 
probably obtain better performance from their subordinates if they ex­
plained exactly what is expected and if the job is done improperly, what 
was wrong about and how it should have been done. Any type of evaluation 
should be disgarded as it appears they show no positive contribution to 
learning for individuals. 
Recommendations 
The results of this experiment raised some interesting questions 
concerning the role of feedback in a multiple-cue probability learning 
task. Obviously more experiments need to be conducted to both confirm 
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and supplement the findings presented in this paper. A particular repli­
cation under less "severe" evaluation cut-points is obviously required. 
By increasing the chances for a good evaluation would discouragement be 
eliminated, thereby possibly raising the level of achievement? Would 
harsher or milder evaluative adjectives affect performance in any dif­
ferent way? It would also be interesting to find out what effect, if 
any, a combination of evaluative and outcome feedback would have on per­
formance. These are questions that should be addressed in future 
research as well as conducting replications of this experiment. 
Within the framework of the Brunswikian lens model we have seen 
studies dealing with lens model feedback, outcome feedback, error-prone 
feedback and evaluative feedback. These studies indicate that lens model 
feedback generates the best performance with error-prone and evaluative 
feedback generating the least desireable performance. Within a "real 
world" setting, however, it seems unlikely that lens model feedback would 
normally be available. Outcome feedback is probably the best feedback 
that a decision maker could hope for and even then, learning was shown 
to be extremely slow for complex tasks (Goldberg, 1968). Yet in a setting 
such as the "real world" where most tasks are considered to be of a com­
plex nature, and in all likelihood the feedback received is either error 
prone or evaluative, decision makers are having apparent rapid success 
in learning these complex tasks. What is it then that aids these deci­
sion makers, since it is obviously not the feedback received? Ideally 
more research should be conducted under more realistic settings or in the 
"real world" setting itself. Since this is not always easily done, fu­
ture research should consider the total environment from which the subject 
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"makes sense of the problem", such as prior training and experience, 
error within feedback, and the outside pressures normally associated 
with decision making. It could be as Yntema and Torgerson (1961) sug­
gested that "good judgment may turn out to be a simpler matter than we 
would like to think it is," or it could be that training and prior 
experiences enables individuals to make sense of the problem quickly 
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Computer Program Used to Generate 
Cues and Distal Variable 





30 PRINT 'Xl = ';A> fX2= •;B,•X3= * S C j • Y = »;Y 
35 NEXT I 
40 END 
XI - -19.624168 X2 = -3.9989311 X3 = -6 .2498182 Y = 2 .334801 
X I = 39.39876 X2 = 25.813257 X3 = 30.905101 Y= 30 .027993 
XI = -10.48587 X2 = 1 .0544106 X3 = -.0978148 Y = -1.4093173 
XI = 33.663068 X2 = .16153008 X3 = 2.4814129 Y= .95938623 
XI -5.9556642 X2 = -5 .4998028 X3 = -3 .766765 Y= -6.1476237 
?! = 26.771213 X2 = 4.1116992 X3 = - .33698797 Y = 6 .8935078 X 1 = .76346546 X2 = -3.2658505 X3 = -9.0839618 Y= -1 .6603994 
XI = -4•7747409 X2 = -8 .9307525 X3 = -21 .638207 Y = -6.003713 
XI = 27.384548 X2 = 10.331969 X3 = -3.6585015 Y = 1.9414842 
XI 7.2315493 X2 = -12.815439 X3 = -26.758162 Y= -10.808224 
XI = 9.9832722 X2 = -.02785981 X3 = -7 .7220023 Y = .23245633 
XI = 1 9.709723 X2 = 3.3838397 X3 = 9.0110648 Y= 1 .4965516 
XI = 8.7869191 X2 = 8.9501905 X3 = 9.3556225 Y= 9.8828912 
XI -11 .22158 X2 = -4.9530998 X3 = -10 .334577 Y = -6.5925014 
XI = .32041609 X2 = -6.1006871 X3 = -9.0824062 Y = -4.95094 
X I = -8.2612618 X2 = .28280348 X3 = -19.566303 Y = -2 .0802552 
XI = -27 . 1 90607 X2 = -7.5991276 X3 = 12.123707 Y = -4.1671908 
XI = 26.304834 X2 = 4 .8412994 X3 = 11.100978 Y = 8.4078473 
X I = .09909064 X2 = 6 .4872962 X3 = .23993611 Y= 1 .6438937 
XI 13.382414 X2 = 6.5888349 X3 = 21.666641 Y= 1 1 .185948 
XI = -4.2664383 X2 = -1 1 .510548 X3 = -20 .889497 Y = -13.619338 
XI - -24.619184 X2 = -6 .7410 949 X3 = -12 .75806 Y= -5.514313 XI = 7.8944012 X2 = -3.3834443 X3 = -11.186538 Y = -5.622372 
XI = -40 .287601 X2 = -17.682472 X3 = —24 .979992 Y= -20.225407 
XI ss 23.088141 X2 = -2 .5407988 X3 = 1 .7705774 Y= 4.6776414 
XI -1 .3540468 X2 = -.26171654 X3 = .79470694 Y = 4.3311501 
XI = 9.4384476 X2 = 9 .492271 2 X3 = 6.5470797 Y= 6.875478 
XI 12.480887 X2 = 3.6011219 X3 = -9 .5226097 Y = -2 .8863931 
XI = -1 .2235525 X2 = -11.968052 X3 = -13.855501 Y = -6.4261985 
XI = 1 .766735 X2 = 1 .8474868 X3 = -9 .7351396 Y= -1.1970907 
XI = 2.4248537 X2 = -5 .3025303 X3 = -18.801529 Y= -9.2069399 
XI -17.75145 X2 = -6.6832084 X3 = -6.9518095 Y= -4.3757081 
XI = -31.020753 X2 = -10.492779 X3 = 6.569823 Y= - 10.944034 
XI = -18.135506 X2 = -5.966Q229 X3 = -.31270385 Y= -7.3421222 
XI = 1 .2875384 X2 = -1 1 .926949 X3 = -24 .23545 Y= -12.069287 
XI = -12.131298 X2 = 1 .3302064 X3 = 3.358078 Y= 3.8293123 
47 
X I = -12.350362 X2 = -3 .325575 X3 = 5.2750468 Y = - .01010358 
X I = 42.440817 X2 = 7.6883385 X3 = 1 2 .706037 Y= 10 .678547 
XI 6.317222 1 X2 = -11.963981 X3 = -17.198094 Y= -6.9640881 
X I = -4.7283822 X2 = -9.2630132 X3 = 4.849551 9 Y = -3.8294703 
XI = -22.863425 X2 = -22.362 831 X3 = -35.496489 Y = -19.458119 
X I = -11.637117 X2 = 1.8595853 X3 = 5 .4396546 Y = -1.638639 
X I = -2.0171478 X2 = 8.3916357 X3 = -3.5796231 Y= 4.6224147 
XI = 21.706068 X2 = 10.541081 X3 = 9. 1486532 Y = 10..272042 
X I = -7.7373 X2 = 4 .4997907 X3 = -4 .1612005 Y = 1.1364156 
X I = 7.0474563 X2 = 8.6840466 X3 = .56296587 Y= 9.4522399 
XI = -24.241482 X2 = -.75478852 X3 = -11.37 5631 Y= -3.4443295 
X I = -2.7841389 X2 = 13.147792 X3 = 30 .606506 Y= 10 .802426 
XI = -37.231195 X2 = 8.3945531 X3 = -29 .995469 Y= -2.3432821 
XI = -3.1258619 X2 = 11.347094 X3 = 21 .036687 Y= 5.7465226 
XI = -18.924691 X2 = -12.438569 X3 = -7.0393765 Y= -8.9706987 
XI - -12.193689 X2 = -16.371207 X3 = 2 .8125739 Y= -15.50912 
XI = -1.3563627 X 2 = -3 .85870 1 9 X3 = -7.3796207 Y = -5.2416748 
XI = 14.18179 X2 = -.88867188 X3 = 3 .4610951 Y = ' 6.9834536 
X I = 8.7933996 X2 = -11.099741 X3 = -25.776783 Y= -15.466592 
X I = . 0 8 2 7 5 7 7 7 X2 = - 1 3 . 3 6 9 2 9 3 X3 = -1 5.478 1 8 Y = -7.0074427 
XI = 34.70 7518 X2 = 22.12854 X3 = 9.3559492 Y = 24.886591 
XI = 14.196219 X2 = -.8 546 930 6 X3 = 14 .6759 Y= 3.3188897 
X I = -1.6819164 X2 = -1.7652914 X3 = -1 1 .067027 Y = -5.8248091 
XI 14.916297 X2 = 13.885227 X3 = 26.036229 Y = 13.460225 
XI = -32.877031 X2 = -7.2486613 X3 = -10.769261 Y= -9.4951361 
XI = 3.2350281 X2 = 10.196771 X3 = -1 .7028976 Y = -1.3868374 
XI - -8.0227342 X2 = 4 .0506086 X3 = 9.1016978 Y= 5.5884296 
XI = 16.025306 X2 = -.7600385 X3 = 26.230796 Y = 5.8736545 
XI = 10.921787 X2 = 12.130628 X3 = 17.06534 Y = 3.5516918 
X 1 = -32.836519 X2 = -5.4397753 X3 = 2.7025932 Y = -2.9226512 
XI = -9.810739 X2 = 10.767364 X3 = 9.6300578 Y = 7.415818 
XI = 11.695045 X2 = 3 .091 9629 X3 = -10 .332803 Y = -.04776299 
XI = -37.778847 X2 = -13.144732 X3 = 13 .043953 Y = -11.311852 
XI = 12.005492 X2 = 14 .679686 X3 = 6.0630053 Y= 11.205198 
XI = 7.099123 X2 = 10.141955 X3 = 27 .839253 Y = 7.3014635 
XI = 6.9298998 X2 = .13694972 X3 = -4 .4951558 Y = 2.5154191 
X I = 2.9473421 X2 = 6.35261 X3 = -1 7 .883204 Y = .04902482 
XI = 7.5547767 X2 = -2.3233557 X3 = 5.3063303 Y = - .63830435 
XI = -18.777341 X2 = -1 5.7.47531 X3 = -2.111311 Y= -10.57938 
XI = 12.638908 X2 = 1.9193354 X3 = 13.842595 Y= 2.8330016 
XI = -14.227514 X2 = -1 2 .230794 X3 = 15.193923 Y = -12.409328 
XI = -14.288996 X2 = 5.8357105 X3 = 10.380412 Y = 4.6172285 
XI = 19.748926 X2 = 5 .4792357 X3 = -1.5421438 Y = 8 .2649463 
XI = -1.1844149 X2 = 4 .2815679 X3 = -2.4796557 Y- 6.0239297 
Cues As Displayed On Screen 
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1. -19.6 -4.0 -6.0 
2. 39.4 25.8 30.9 
3. -10.5 1 .0 -. 1 
4. 33.7 .2 2.5 
5. -6.0 -5.5 -3.8 
6. 26.8 4.1 -.3 
7. .8 -3.3 -9.1 
8. -4.8 -8.9 -2 1.6 
9. 27.4 10.3 -3.7 
10. 7.2 -12.8 -26.8 
11. 10.0 0.0 -7.7 
12. 19.7 3.4 9.0 
13. 8.8 9.0 9.4 
14. -11.2 -5.0 -10.3 
15. .3 -6.1 -9.1 
16. -8.3 .3 -20.0 
17. -27,2 -7.6 12. 1 
18. 26.3 4.8 11.1 
19. . 1 6.5 .2 
20. 13.4 6.6 21.7 
±1 
. 2 1 . -4.3 -11.5 -20.9 
22. -24.6 -6.7 -12 .8 
23. 7.9 -3.4 -11.2 
24o -40.3 -17.7 -25.0 
25. 23.1 -2.5 1.8 
26. -1.4 -.3 .8 
27. 9.4 9.5 6.5 
28. 12.5 3.6 -9.5 
2 9 . -1.2 -12.0 -13.9 
30. 1.8 1.8 -9.7 
31. 2.4 -5.3 ' -18.8 
32. -17.8 -6.7 -7.0 
33. -31.0 -10.5 6.6 
34. -18,1 -6.0 -.3 
35. 1.3 -11.9 -24.2 
36. - 1 2 . 1 1.3 3.4 
37. - 1 2 . 4 -3.3 5.3 
38. 42.4 7.7 12.7 
39. 6.3 -12,0 -17 . 2 
40. -4.7 -9 .3 4.8 
41. -22.9 -22.4 -35.5 
42. -11.3 1.9 5.4 
43. -2.0 8.4 -3.6 
44. 21.7 10.5 9.1 
45. -7.7 4.5 -4.2 
46. 7.0 8.7 .6 
47. -24.2 -.8 -11.4 
48. -2.8 13.1 30.6 
49. -57.2 8.4 -30.0 
50. -3.1 11.3 21.0 
51. -18.9 -12.4 -7.0 
52. -12.2 -16.4 2.8 
53. -1.4 -3.9 -7.4 
54. 14.2 -.9 3.5 
55. 8.8 -11.1 - 2 5.8 
5 6 . .1 -13.4 -15.5 
57. 34.7 22.1 9.4 
58. 14.2 -.9 14.7 
59. -1.7 -1.8 -11.1 
60. 14.9 13.9 26.0 
X 3 
61. - 3 2 . 9 - 7 . 2 - 1 0 . 8 
62. 3 . 2 1 0 . 2 - 1 . 7 
6 3 . - 8 . 0 4 . 1 9 . 1 
64 o 16 .0 - . 8 26 . 2 
65. 1 0 . 9 1 2 , 1 1 7 . 1 
66. - 3 7 . 8 - 5 . 4 2 . 7 
6 7 . - 9 . 8 1 0 . 8 9 . 6 
6 8 . 1 1 . 7 3 . 1 -10.3 
6 9 . - 3 7 . 8 - 1 3 . 1 1 3 . 0 
70. 1 2 . 0 1 4 . 7 6 . 1 
71. 7 . 1 1 0 . 1 2 7 . 8 
7 2 . 6 . 9 . 1 - 4 . 5 
7 3 o 2 . 9 6 . 4 - 1 7 . 9 
7 4 . 7 . 6 - 2 . 3 5 . 3 
75. -18 . 8 - 1 5 . 7 - 2 . 1 
76. 12.6 1 . 9 1 3 . 8 
7 7 . - 1 4 . 2 -12 . 2 1 5 . 2 
7 8 o - 1 4 . 3 5 . 8 1 0 . 4 
79 o 1 9 . 7 5 . 5 -1.5 
80. -1.2 4 . 3 - 2 . 5 
Group II Evaluations - Good/Bad 
- 2 1 . 5 < Y S < 
Evaluation = Good 
4 1 . 
42 . ( - 3 . 6 
:2.6 
;8.3 
: - . 9 
7 . 5 
: -5 .4 
!8.8 
: -4 .3 
:3.7 
: - n . o 
: - i 7 . 5 
: - 7 . 2 
:5 .o 
: - i 7 . 5 
: -9 .o 
;22.9 
1.3 









- 1 . 4 
12.8 
- 0 . 3 
7.7 
- 7 . 0 
•13.5 
- 3 . 2 
9 . 0 
•13.5 
- 5 . 0 
26 .9 
5 .3 
- 3 . 8 
15.5 




















- 1 1 . 5 < Y o ^ - 7 . 5 : 
- 3 . 4 
3 . 6 
3 . 8 
1.6 
- 4 . 9 
5 .4 
-2.0 
- 1 3 . 3 
9 .2 
5 .3 
0 . 5 
- 2 . 0 
- 2 . 6 
- 1 2 . 6 
0 .8 
- 1 4 . 4 
2 .6 
6 .3 
4 . 0 
0.6; 
7 . 6 ; 
7 . 8 ; 
5 .6 ; 
- . 9 ; 
9 .4 ; 
2 .0 ; 
- 9 . 3 ; 
1 3 . 2 ; 
9 . 3 ; 
4 . 5 ; 
2 .0 ; 
1 .4 ; 
- 8 . 6 ; 
4 . 8 ; 
- 1 0 . 4 ; 
6 .6 ; 
1 0 . 3 ; 
8.0; 
Bad otherwise 
Group III Evaluations - Good/Fair/Bad 
Evaluation = Good if; 
41. (-20.5< Y s< -18.5 
42. (-2.6 -0.6 
43. (3.6 5.6 
44. (9.3 11.3 
45. (0.1 2.1 
46. (8.5 10.5 
47. (-4.4 -2.4 
48. (9.8 11.8 
49. (-3.3 -1.3 
50. (4.7 6.7 
51. (-10.0 -8.0 
52. (-16.5 -14.5 
53. (-6.2 -4.2 
54. (6.0. 8.0 
55. (-16.5 -14.5 
56. (-8.0 -6.0 
57. (23.9 25.9 
58. (2.3 4.3 
59. (-6.8 -4.8 
60. (12.5 14.5 
61. (-10.5 -8.5 
62. (-2.4 -0.4 
63. (4.6 6.6 
64. (4.8 6.8 
65. (2.6 4.6 
66. (-3.9 -1.9 
67. (6.4 8.4 
68. (-1.0 1.0 
69. (-12.3 -10.3 
70. (10.2 12.2 
71. (6.3 8.3 
72. (1.5 3.5 
73. (-1.0 1.0 
74. (-1.6 0.4 
75. (-11.6 -9.6 
76. (1.8 3.8 
77. (-13.4 -11.4 
78. (3.6 5.6 
79. (7.3 9.3 
80. (5.0 7.0 
Fair if; 









































Group IV Evaluations - Very Good/Good/Fair/Bad/Very Bad 
41. (-20<Y s<-19) <-21<Y8 <-18) (-22<YS <-17) (-23.5<YS< -15.5) 
42. (-2.1 -1.1) (-3.1 -0.1) (-4.1 0.9) (-5.6 2.4) 
43. (4.1 5.1) (3.1 6.1) (2.1 7.1) (0.6 8.6) 
44. (9.8 10.8) (8.8 11.8) (7.8 12.8) (6.3 14.3) 
45. (0.6 1.6) (-0.4 2.6) (-1.4 3.6) (-2.9 5.1) 
46. (9 10) (8 11) (7 12) (5.5 13.5) 
47. (-3.9 -2.9) (-4.9 -1.9) (-5.9 -0.9) (-7.4 0.6) 
48. (10.3 11.3) (9.3 12.3) (8.3 13.3) (6.8 14.8) 
49. (-2.8 -1.8) (-3.8 -0.8) (-4.8 0.2) (-6.3 1.7) 
50. (5.2 6.2) (4.2 7.2) (3.2 8.2) (1.7 9.7) 
51. (-9.5 -8.5) (-10.5 -7.5) (-11.5 -6.5) (-13 -5) 
52. (-16 -15) (-17 -14) (-18 -13) (-19.5 -11.5) 
53. (-5.7 -4.7) (-6.7 -3.7) (-7.7 -2.7) (-9.2 -1.2) 
54. (6.5 7.5) (5.5 8.5) (4.5 9.5) (3 11) 
55. (-16 -15) (-17 -14) (-18 -13) (-19.5 -11.5) 
56. (-7.5 -6.5) (-8.5 -5.5) (-9.5 -4.5) (-11 -3) 
57. (24.4 25.4) (23.4 26.4) (22.4 27.4) (20.9 28.9) 
58. (2.8 3.8) (1.8 4.8) (0.8 5.8) (-0.7 7.3) 
59. (-6.3 -5.3) (-7.3 -4.3) (-8.3 -3.3) (-9.8 -1.8) 
60. (13 14) (12 15) (11 16) (9.5 17.5) 
61. (-10 -9) (-11 -8) (-12 -7) (-13.5 -5.5) 
62. (-1.9 -0.9) (-2.9 0.1) (-3.9 1.1) (-5.4 2.6) 
63. (5.1 6.1) (4.1 7.1) (3.1 8.1) (1.6 9.6) 
64. (5.3 6.3) (4.3 7.3) (3.3 8.3) (1.8 9.8) 
65. (3.1 4.1) (2.1 5.1) (1.1 6.1) (-0.4 7.6) 
66. (-3.4 -2.4) (-4.4 -1.4) (-5.4 -0.4) (-6.9 1.1) 
67. (6.9 7.9) (5.9 8.9) (4.9 9.9) (3.4 11.4) 
68. (-0.5 0.5) (-1.5 1.5) (-2.5 2.5) (-4 4) 
69. (-11.8 -10.8) (-12.8 -9.8) (-13.8 -8.8) (-15.3 -7.3) 
70. (10.7 11.7) (9.7 12.7) (8.7 13.7) (7.2 15.2) 
71. (6.8 7.8) (5.8 8.8) (4.8 9.8) (3.3 11.3) 
72. (2 3) (1 4) (0 5) (-1.5 6.5) 
73. (-0.5 0.5) (-1.5 1.5) (-2.5 2.5) (-4 4) 
74. (-1.1 -0.1) (-2.1 0.9) (-3.1 1.9) (-4.6 3.4) 
75. (-11.1 -10.1) (-12.1 -9.1) (-13.1 -8.1) (-14.6 -6.6) 
76. (2.3 3.3) (1.3 4.3) (0.3 5.3) (-1.2 6.8) 
77. (-12.9 -11.9) (-13.9 -10.9) (-14.9 -9.9) (-16.4 -8.4) 
78. (4.1 5.1) (3.1 6.1) (2.1 7.1) (0.6 8.6) 
79. (7.8 8.8) (6.8 9.8) (5.8 10.8) (4.3 12.3) 
80. (5.5 6.5) (4.5 7.5) (3.5 8.5) (2 10) 
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Ins truetions Read to Group I 
You are about to participate in an experiment to measure learning. 
You are asked to make decisions based on the information provided you on 
the three sheets you have before you. These numbers represent daily 
stock market predictions by three local "experts". Assume that each 
numbered trial is a new day and the predictions listed for each trial 
were made the previous day. 
I will display each day's predictions on the board as I read them 
out loud. As each day's prediction is read, please record your predic­
tion for that day on the answer sheet. Make your predictions based sole­
ly on the information before you. When 40 trials have been completed 
please put down your pencils and a 5 minute break will be given. I re­
peat, please do not make any predictions beyond #40! 
BREAK 
You will continue to make predictions as before, however, after 
each prediction I will tell you the actual stock market performance for 
that day. This may now be recorded next to your prediction in the space 
provided. You now have an additional piece of information with which to 
make your next prediction. This procedure will be followed until 80 
trials have been completed. 
56 
Instructions Read to Group II 
You are about to participate in an experiment to measure learning. 
You are asked to make decisions based on the information provided you on 
the three sheets you have before you. These numbers represent daily 
stock market predictions by three local "experts". Assume that each 
numbered trial is a new day and the predictions listed for each trial 
were made the previous day. 
I will display each day's predictions on the board as I read them 
out loud. As each day's prediction is read, please record your predic­
tion for that day on the answer sheet. Make your predictions based sole­
ly on the information before you. When 40 trials have been completed 
please put down your pencils and a 5 minute break will be given. I re­
peat, please do not make any predictions beyond #40! 
BREAK 
Please look at responses 41-80. You will notice that next to each 
set of numbers there is a blank space for your prediction and then the 
letters G and B. These letters stand for GOOD and BAD. Starting with 
#41 please record your prediction as before, but this time I will come 
around and evaluate each prediction by circling the appropriate letter 
before you go on to the next one. The evaluation is based on how close 
your prediction is to the actual market performance. You now have an 
additional piece of information with which to make your next decision. 
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Instructions Read to Group III 
You are about to participate in an experiment to measure learning. 
You are asked to make decisions based on the information provided you on 
the three sheets you have before you. These numbers represent daily 
stock market predictions by three local "experts". Assume that each 
numbered trial is a new day and the predictions listed for each trial 
were made the previous day. 
I will display each day's predictions on the board as I read them 
out loud. As each day's prediction is read, please record your predic­
tion for that day on the answer sheet. Make your predictions based sole­
ly on the information before you. When 40 trials have been completed 
please put down your pencils and a 5 minute break will be given. I re­
peat, please do not make any predictions beyond #40! 
BREAK 
Please look at responses 41-80. You will notice that next to each 
set of numbers there is a blank space for your prediction and then the 
letters G, F and B. These letters stand for GOOD, FAIR and BAD. Start­
ing with #41 please record your prediction as before, but this time I will 
come around and evaluate each prediction by circling the appropriate 
letter before you go on to the next one. This evaluation is based on 
how close your prediction is to the actual market performance. You now 
have an additional piece of information with which to make your next pre­
diction. 
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Instructions Read to Group IV 
You are about to participate in an experiment to measure learning. 
You are asked to make decisions based on the information provided you on 
the three sheets you have before you. These numbers represent daily 
stock market predictions by three local "experts". Assume that each 
numbered trial is a new day and the predictions listed for each trial 
were made the previous day. 
I will display each day's predictions on the board as I read them 
out loud. As each day's prediction is read, please record your predic­
tion for that day on the answer sheet. Make your predictions based sole­
ly on the information before you. When 40 trials have been completed 
please put down your pencils and a 5 minute break will be given. I re­
peat, please do not make any predictions beyond #40.' 
BREAK 
Please look at responses 41-80. You will notice that next to each 
set of numbers is a blank space for your prediction and then the letters 
VG, G, F, B, VB. These letters stand for VERY GOOD, GOOD, FAIR, BAD, and 
VERY BAD. Starting with #41 please record your predictions as before, 
but this time I will come around and evaluate each prediction by circling 
the appropriate letter before you go on to the next one. This evaluation 
is based on how close your prediction was to the actual market perfor­
mance. You now have an additional piece of information with which to 
make your next prediction. 
Correlations and Z-transformations for 
the outcome feedback group 
trials 1-40 trials 41-80 
Re .938 .934 
ral -861 # 8 6 5 
ra2 .861 > 9 0 6 
ra3 .890 r = .858 .920 






Zr . 1-2972 1.3129 al 
Zr 0 i- 2 9 7 2 1.5047 
a2 
Zr , 1-̂ 219 1.5890 a3 
Z 1.2707 
ra4 1.3290 
Zr , L1388 1.4077 
a5 
r 0 = .891 ra4 .854 a . 8 6 9 a 
ra5 .814 .887 
Rsl .958 .956 
Rs2 .942 _ . 974 
Rs3 .957 R = .935 .979 R = .959 
Rs4 .924 . 9 3 7 
G2 .947 . 979 
G3 -997 G = .987 .997 G = .994 
G4 .992 
Gc .999 
Correlations and Z-transformations for 
the 2cl evaluative feedback group 
trials 1-40 trials 41-80 
Re -938 .934 
ra6 -929 .854 
ra7 .921 _ .795 
ra8 -895 r a = .893 .880 
ra9 -784 . 7 5 5 
ral0 -895 .855 
Rs6 -980 .926 
Rs7 -988 _ .905 
Rs8 -915 R s = .958 .966 
Rs9 -871 .902 
Rsl0 -952 .898 
G6 -994 .983 
G7 -975 _ .940 
G8 .990 G = .989 .993 
G9 -967 .936 
G10 -997 .991 
Z r a 6 1.6510 1.2707 
Z r a 7 1.5956 1.0849 
Z r a 8 1.4465 1.3758 
Z r a 9 1.0557 .9845 
Z r a l 0 1.4465 1.2745 
Correlations and Z-transforms for the 
3d evaluative feedback group 
trials 1-40 trials 41-80 
R .938 .934 
e 
r .874 .771 
r \t .879 .838 
r a7. .911 r = .908 .728 
ra!f .928 a .766 
r*7* .931 .811 al5 
R n .937 .952 
R S7^ .988 .974 
R S7^ .941 R_ = .965 .921 
Rs\l .948 .917 
R3;,- .978 .896 slo 
G u .972 .931 
G 1 2 .956 .906 
G 1 3 .971 G = .974 .913 
G 1 4 .973 .921 
15 .988 .969 
Z 1.3498 1.0228 
rall 
Z 1.3713 1.2144 
ral2 
Z 1.5334 .9245 
ral3 
Z 1.6438 1.0106 
ral4 
Z 1.6658 1.1299 
ral5 
Correlations and Z-transformations for th 
5cl evaluative feedback, group 
trials 1-40 trials 41-80 
R e .938 .934 
r a l 6 .844 .522 
r a l 7 .811 .640 
r a l 8 .916 r « .869 .841 
r a l 9 .822 .794 
r a 2Q .870 .647 
Rg 1 6 .960 .546 
R s l 7 .836 _ .713 
R s l 8 .971 R = .943 .976 
R s l 9 .966 .929 
R s 2 0 .914 .735 
G 1 6 .986 .961 
G 1 ? .988 _ .981 
G 1 8 .973 G = .980 .936 
G,9 .970 .943 
G 2 Q .975 .953 
Z„ 1.2349 .5791 
ral6 
Z 1.1299 .7582 
ral7 
Z 1.5636 1.2246 
ral8 
Z 1.3847 1.0822 
ral9 
Z 1.3331 .7701 
ra20 
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Program Used to Compute Z-transforrnations 
R0SE-D0NALD*ZETE.MAIN 
1 DIMENSI0N RC50),N(50),ZC50) 
2 READC5,1) K 
3 READC5>1) CRCI),1=1 ,K) 
4 READC5*1) CN(I),1=1,K) 
5 1 F0RMATC ) 
6 ZBA*R=0 
7 ZBAR2=0 
8 D0 10 1 = 1 ,K 
9 Z( I ) = .5'*AL0G( C 1+RC I > >/( 1-R( I > ) > 
10 • ZBAR=ZBAR+(N< I)-3)*Z( I) 
11 10 ZBAR2=ZBAR2+N(I )-3 
12 ZBA=ZBAR/ZBAR2 
' 13 RBAR=(EXP(2.*ZBA>-1. ) / ( EXP ( 2 . * ZBA ) + 1.) 
14 WRITE(6,15) ZBA 
15 15 F0RMATC1X,'ZBAR IS'^FIO.6) 
16 D0 25 I=UK 
17 25 WRITE<6>20) Z( I ) 
18 . 20 F0RMATC1X,F10.6) 
19 WRITE(6,18) RBAR 
20 18 F0RMATCIX,'REAR IS',F10.6) 
21 ' END 
END PRT 
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Analysis of Variance Across Glasses of Feedback 
POINT VALUE 










1 1 .'10228000 + 0 1 
12 .12144000+01 
13 .'92450000 + 00 
14 .10106000+01 
15 .11299000+01 
16 .'579 10000+00 
17 .7 58 20000+00 
18 VI 2246000 + 01 









-.' 1 1 31 7997+00 
'•" 17772003 + 00 
-.'21 357998+00 
.76420024-01 










TREAT REPL. "' EST OF EFFECTS 
1 5 .28615506+00 




SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE 
TREATMENT .79566921+00 3 .26522307+00 
ERROR .48434360+00 16 .30271475-01 
TOTAL .128 00127+01 19 
F VALUE .87614849+01 PROBABILITY F IS EXCEEDED .00114255 
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Test of Means (ra/Re) Between the Last 
Two Blocks of 20 Trials 
H o : ^1 " ̂ 2 = ^ ^1 = ^ e a n P e r c e n t achievement for trials 41-60 
**1* ̂ 1 " ̂ ? ̂  ̂  ^2 ~ ̂ e a n P e r c e n t achievement for trials 61-80 
0/C FB 2cl FB 3cl FB 5cl FB 
.940 .880 .840 .850 
\ .990 .920 .860 .740 
ss1 .0126 .0070 .0042 .0708 
ss 2 .0815 .0263 .0159 .5642 
CO
 .0118 .0042 .0025 .0794 
P 
t Q -.713 -.781 -.569 .943 u (N.S.) (N.S.) (N.S.) (N.S.) 
where 
= ^1 " *2 
t o S p / T ^ L ~ ^n-2 
n n 
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Duncan's Multiple Range Test 
for Major Hypothesis 
s - .0814 e n 2 = 16 a - .05 
Sign. Range 










Z1 = 1.4287 
Z1T = 1.1980 
I vs IV; .5459 > .2710 
I vs III; .3683 > .2564 
I vs II; .2307 < .2442 
ZIII = 1 , 0 6 0 4 II vs IV; .3152 > .2564 II vs III; .1376 < .2442 
Z T W = .8828 III vs IV; .1776 < .3360 
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